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PRIMARY JURISDICTION RECONSIDERED.
THE ANTI-TRUST LAWS.
Louis L. Jaffe t
The doctrine of "primary jurisdiction" is a valuable corollary to
the administration of the statutory purposes committed to nonjudicial
agencies. It is, however, becoming a shibboleth. If the courts have
at times resisted the legitimate claims of administrative autonomy
under the smart of criticism, they can too much repent their sins.
They may exaggerate the so-called "expertise" of the agencies and
they may overstate its relevance to the solution of issues for which
they share primary responsibility with the agencies. The applica-
tion of anti-trust laws to the regulated industries raises the problem
acutely.' It will be useful, I believe, to explore the foundations of the
doctrine and then to. examine it more particularly in the context of
the anti-trust laws.
THE QUESTION STATED
Recently Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Far East Conference v.
United States,' has thus described the "principle" which goes by the
name of the "primary jurisdiction;" it is, he says, a principle,
now firmly established, that in cases raising issues
of fact not within the conventional experience of judges or cases
requiring the exercise of administrative discretion, agencies cre-
ated by Congress for regulating the subject matter should not
t Byrne Professor of Administrative Law, Harvard Law School. Author of
JUDICIAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN RELATIONS (1933); ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, CASES
AND MATERIALS (1953).
1. Professor Louis B. Schwartz has recently canvassed this problem in his ex-
cellent article, Legal Restriction of Competition in the Regulated Indiatries: An
Abdication of Judicial Responsibility, 67 HARV. L. Rzv. 436 (1954), -particularly
at 464.
2. 342 U.S. 570 (1952)
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be passed over. This is so even though the facts after they have
been appraised by specialized competence serve as a premise for
legal consequences to be judicially defined. Uniformity and
consistency in the regulation of business entrusted to a particular
agency are secured, and the limited functions of review by the
judiciary are more rationally exercised, by preliminary resort for
ascertaining and interpreting the circumstances underlying legal
issues to agencies that are better equipped than courts by speciali-
zation, by insight gained through experience, and by more flexible
procedure." 1
Justice Frankfurter continues, pointing out that the Government de-
manding judicial relief under the anti-trust laws is as much bound by
this principle as is any private party, reasoning that "The same con-
siderations of administrative expertise apply, whoever initiates the
action." '
We may assume for the moment the correctness of the decision
in Far East. Nevertheless, there is danger in grounding the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction so insistently in the fact of "administrative ex-
pertise." For lack of proper pruning it will crowd out other useful
jurisdictions. Limitations already judicially established will not be
understood and will be put down as merely arbitrary. A case for
example, in the same volume of the United States Reporter, Interna-
tional Longshorermen's Union v. Juneau Corporation,5 has puzzled some
who have come to understand the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in
the all-embracing sense which, from the language of Far .ast, might
appear to be justified. In that case an employer was allowed to recover
damages (under the Taft-Hartley Act) for a secondary boycott. The
National Labor Relations Board is competent to declare such a boycott
to be an unfair labor practice and to order it stopped. Can the court
"pass over" the Board and award damages without a prior ruling from
the Board? The Labor Board in common with all administrative
agencies has been stated by the courts to possess "expertise." Yet
prior resort was not required. The statute itself, said the Court, speci-
fied two different remedies, one administrative, the other judicial.
"Certainly there is nothing in the language of . . . [the statute]
which makes its remedy dependent on any prior administrative deter-
mination that an unfair labor practice has been committed." ' But
3. Id. at 574-5.
4. Id. at 576.
5. 342 U.S. 237 (1952). Cf. Texas State Fed. of Labor v. Brown & Root, Inc.,
246 S.W.2d 938 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); Russell v. International Union, 258 Ala.
615, 64 So.2d 384 (1953).
6. International Longshoremen's Union v. Juneau Corp., 342 U.S. 237, 244
(1952).
In Garner v. Teamsters Local Union, 74 Sup. Ct. 161, 165-6 (1953), 'Mr. Justice
Jackson seems, in the following statement, to overlook the Juneau case: "Congress
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that, of course, does not distinguish the case from other cases in which
the doctrine has been applied. In the famous Abilene 7 case from
which the doctrine derives, the judicial remedy was, if not created by
the statute, at least explicitly and unqualifiedly confirmed. And yet
the decision in the Juneau case is in no way exceptional either as statute
law or judicial decision. Another example: the enforcement of the
Clayton Act is committed simultaneously to the Federal Trade Com-
mission, the Attorney General, and private party action. It seems
never even to have been suggested that primary jurisdiction is appli-
cable to original judicial action under it. If "expertise" is the dominant
factor it must be expertise in a sense more narrow than is usual in
administrative law; or it must be that expertise is but one of the factors
in the constellation.
The conception of primary jurisdiction cannot be stated as an
invariable rule except in the specific instances where its incidence has
been judicially determined. But it is possible to describe the legal situa-
tion in which its application is relevant. These are the principal
features: (1) In all such situations there is at some point a claim
enforceable by original judicial action, that is to say, a claim which in
whole or in part is tried and enforced by judicial action. It is this that
distinguishes the doctrine from the doctrine which demands exhaustion
of administrative remedies before seeking judicial interference. In the
exhaustion situation the claim is enforceable by administrative action
alone; the judiciary is being invoked to correct or quash the adminis-
trative action. The exhaustion doctrine where applicable forbids ju-
dicial supervision of the administrative process until the latter has been
exhausted. And now to continue: (2) The original judicial action may
derive from (a) common law, (b) the same statute which created
the administrative jurisdiction (in Abilene the statute provided an
action for damages, and confirmed such common law actions as might
obtain), (c) another statute. (3) The determination of the judicial
action may require the resolution of issues which are more or less
related to issues which an administrative agency is competent to re-
solve. It is not a requisite condition of the doctrine that the agency
did not merely lay down a substantive rule of law to be enforced by any tribunal
competent to apply law generally to the parties. It went on to confide primary
interpretation and application of its rules to a specific and specially constituted
tribunal and prescribed a particular procedure for investigation, complaint and
notice, and hearing and decision, including judicial relief pending a final administra-
tive order. Congress evidently considered that centralized administration of specially
designed procedures was necessary to obtain uniform application of its substantive
rules and to avoid these diversities and conflicts likely to result from a variety of
local procedures and attitudes toward labor controversies." This decision, however,
deals with the applicability of state law to a situation within the scope of the federal
act.
7. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907).
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is empowered to grant any or part of the relief being judicially sought,8
though occasionally judges have thought otherwise.9 It may be enough
that the question is one which in some connection now or later may
be a premise of administrative action, though it should be a factor
against the application of the doctrine that the agency is not presently
competent to give any relief.
In such situations, then, we are faced with a conflict between two
putatively competent jurisdictions. In each instance there is a con-
crete complex made up of specific statutory and, in some cases, com-
mon law arrangements. It does violence to the specific features of
the situation to solve it by the abstraction of administrative expertise.
This analysis is sometimes "loaded" by the implication that the court
is competing for jurisdiction, as was true of the old unworthy fight by
law against equity."0 But the jurisdiction of the courts, be it under the
anti-trust laws, the common law or the very statute creating the adminis-
trative agency, is not to be regarded primarily as a source of institu-
tional power. It, too, just as much as administrative power, will
represent a facet of public policy. Neither administrative nor judicial
power should be set off from the interest which each is established
to protect. There is a disposition, which is the more unwarranted as
time accumulates evidence, to treat administrative actions-in contra-
8. In the leading case of General American Tank Car Corp. v. El Dorado
Terminal Co., 308 U.S. 422 (1940), the action was for breach of contract. The
defendant pleaded that enforcement would work an illegal rebate to a shipper.
The controversy between plaintiff, a shipper, and defendant, a supplier of tank
cars, was not subject to the jurisdiction of the ICC. The Supreme Court, neverthe-
less, referred the question of illegal rebate to the ICC. A claim was then made
that the ICC had no jurisdiction to make a declaration which would serve no
function other than to advise the Court. On direct appeal from the ICC ruling on
the rebate, the ICC was held to have such jurisdiction. El Dorado Oil Works
v. United States, 328 U.S. 12 (1946). The ICC has held that it has jurisdiction
to interpret its certificates in aid of litigation. Atlantic Freight Lines, Inc., 51
M.C.C. 175 (1949).
In S.S.W., Inc. v. Air Transport Ass'n, 191 F.2d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1951), the
court, in a suit for damages under the anti-trust act, required prior recourse to the
CAB though CAB power over the practices in question is limited to a cease and
desist order.
In Bell Potato Chip Co. v. Aberdeen Truck Line, 43 M.C.C. 337 (1944), dis-
cussed at note 47 infra, the ICC claimed jurisdiction to determine the past reasonable-
ness of motor carrier rates in support of a damage action though it has no power
to award reparations in such cases. See also Continental Charters Inc., 3 PixK &
FIscHER AD. LAw (2d ser.) 130 (CAB 1953) discussed at note 54 infra.
9. E.g., Pennsylvania R.R. v. Fox & London, Inc., 93 F.2d 669 (2d Cir.
1938) ; Clark dissenting in S.S.W., Inc. v. Air Transport Ass'n, 191 F.2d 658, 665
(D.C. Cir. 1951); Texas State Fed. of Labor v. Brown & Root, Inc., 246 S.W.2d
938 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); ef. Slick Airways, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 107
F. Supp. 199 (D.N.J. 1952). This case reaches a result contrary to S.S.W., Inc. v.
Air Transport Ass'n, supra, though not solely on the ground that the CAB has no
reparation power. And see the discussion in text at note 41 infra, of Montana-Dakota
Co. v. Northwestern Public Service Co., 341 U.S. 246 (1951).
10. Thus in Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 575 (1952),
Mr. Justice Frankfurter quotes Mr. Justice Stone's warning against repetition of
the struggle between law and equity.
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distinction to judicial action-as manifestations of some abstract "pub-
lic interest" quite divorced from private claims and pressure. In decid-
ing. whether to require prior administrative recourse, the respective
claims of the opposing interests are entitled to be considered.
If then "expertise" as such is not determinative how are these
opposed claims to be evaluated? The answer, I think, should be
grounded in the notion of statutory purpose. If "expertise" be a
relevant datum implied in the statutory scheme it is yet no more rele-
vant than the statute (plus the total legal situation in which it is found)
makes it. It is undoubtedly an implied aspect of the statutory pur-
pose that a specialized administrative tribunal has been created to deal
with problems in a certain area of conflict; statutes setting up agencies
may be assumed to focus the solution of the problem in terms of the
development of special competence. But a grant of power implies a
limit. The simultaneous grant of jurisdiction to the courts or a failure
to abolish jurisdiction potentially conflicting may imply such a limit.
The statutory purpose is seldom sufficiently explicit to resolve the
conflict. It becomes necessary to construct a system not in the un-
mediated term of the dominance of a presumed expertise but in terms
of what is necessary to make all of the prescribed procedures workable.
This system must perforce include concurrent judicial remedies in so far
as explicitly created and those judicial remedies otherwise created in
so far as they survive.
The upshot may be that as the court finally works it out in a
particular case these judicial remedies do not survive. Where the
statute establishing the administrative organ specifically creates or rec-
ognizes a judicial remedy this result is not possible. But where the
asserted judicial remedy rests on common law or an independent
statute (usually prior) it may be thought that the administrative statute
excludes all other forums. Strictly the doctrine of primary jurisdic-
tion in these latter cases had nothing on which to operate. The same
arguments, however, which support that doctrine will, when carried
further, produce the total extinction of the competing judicial remedies.
Let us turn now to the cases.
THE GROWTH OF THE DOCTRINE
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction was established in the land-
mark case of Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co." A shipper
claiming that a duly published carrier rate was "unreasonable" sued
the carrier in a state court for the excess. The Supreme Court revers-
11. 204 U.S. 426 (1907).
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ing the state court held that the action did not lie. The Interstate
Commerce Commission alone was competent to determine whether the
carrier rate was reasonable. The Commerce Act, reasoned Mr. Jus-
tice White, was intended (by establishing a uniform published rate) to
abolish preferences and discriminations. If power existed in courts
or juries to revise a published rate there could be no uniformity, and
this ". . . would render the enforcement of the act impossible." 12
The Act, it is true, did provide that nothing ". . . shall in any way
abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by
statute... ." ' Justice White, admitting that the action lay at com-
mon law, nevertheless concluded that the " . Act cannot be held
to destroy itself." 14
It will be seen that in this germinal decision there was no explicit
reliance on expertness as the controlling consideration, however much
it might be thought implied in the rationale. In the years immediately
following there was a considerable body of decisions which applied or
rejected Abilene in terms of the statutory requirement for uniform
treatment. These cases involved either rates or services, one fruitful
source of controversy being the allocation of coal cars in times of
emergency. The cases appeared to turn very much on the pleadings.
If the pleading adverted to a carrier rule or even an established carrier
custom and then attacked the rule as unreasonable or discriminatory the
action would be dismissed. 5 If the complaint alleged a failure to
abide by rule or custom it was held that Abilene did not bar the
action.'
12. Id. at 441.
13. 24 STAT. 387 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §22 (1946).
14. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 446 (1907).
15. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Pitcairn Coal Co., 215 U.S. 481 (1910) (attack
on published scheme for allocating cars in emergency; this is the leading case);
Robinson v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 222 U.S. 506 (1912) (published rate allegedly
discriminatory); Midland Valley R.R. v. Barkley, 276 U.S. 482 (1928).
16. Pennsylvania R.R. v. International Coal Co., 230 U.S. 184 (1913); Penn-
sylvania R.R. v. Puritan Coal Co., 237 U.S. 121 (1915) (departure from published
rules of car distribution). Kelly v. Union Stockyards Co., 190 F.2d 860 (7th Cir.
1951) may be correct on the facts but seems completely out of line in its statement
that the question of whether the defendant is violating a "practice," being one of
fact, is exclusively for the administrative agency. In Mitchell Coal Co. v. Penn-
sylvania R.R., 230 U.S. 247 (1913) plaintiff coal company claimed that the railroad
was making discriminatory allowances to its rivals for carrying their coal to a
central terminal. This allowance was not published but the Court interpreted the
published rate as covering carriage from the mine and so entitling to an allowance
a mine company which carried coal to a central terminal; whether the allowance
was excessive was for the Commission. Justice Pitney, who rather deplored the
extensions of the primary jurisdiction doctrine, dissented in an interesting opinion.
He believed that Abilene should be applied only to protect a published rate or al-
lowance. He argued also that since the attacked practice had been discontinued the
objectives of the action were entirely judicial and raised no questions of administra-
tive uniformity. ". . administration, management, regulation, concern themselves
with the present and the future." Id. at 284. He was not troubled by the majority's
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In some cases the courts have upheld complaints based on an
alleged failure to fufill the common law duty to serve,lr but where it
appeared that such a complaint might implicitly involve an attack on
the reasonableness or fairness of a carrier practice it has been rejected,
at least if the practice involves typical transportation factors of an
economic character thought to require administrative evaluation. In
Loomis v. Lehigh Valley R.R.,' s for example, a shipper complained
of the failure of the railroad to furnish lumber for bulkheads for ship-
ping grain. His claim was that the railroad had a common law duty
to provide adequate facilities for the carriage at the published rate. It
appeared that the question was typical of a host of questions con-
cerning the furnishing of special equipment; e.g., heat for fruit and
vegetables in winter. With these the ICC had from time to time
struggled. It had specifically rejected shippers' claims for car fittings.
Said the Court:
"An adequate consideration of the present controversy would
require acquaintance with many intricate facts of transportation.
In the last analysis the instant cause presents a problem
which directly concerns rate-making and is peculiarly administra-
tive. . . . And the preservations of uniformity and prevention
of discrimination render essential some appropriate ruling by the
Interstate Commerce Commission before it may be stbmitted to
a court." 19"
I shall have more to say as to how far this administrative power
supersedes the application of the common law to the regulated car-
rier. But at this point it should be made clear what is implied in
primary jurisdiction as exemplified by Abilene. It does much more
somewhat theoretic claim that reparations even here would promote lack of past
uniformity, but he insisted that in any case complete uniformity in law enforcement
was "an unattainable dream." Ibid. The majority decision is one of the earliest
to stress the point that the courts do not possess the necessary expertness to decide
this sort of issue.
17. Eastern Ry. v. Littlefield, 237 U.S. 140 (1915) (failure to deliver cars as
agreed); Pennsylvania R.R. v. Sonman Coal Co., 242 U.S. 120 (1916) (action for
refusal to deliver cars, Court said there is a common law duty to deliver cars
except in an emergency). Quaere if this case is not inconsistent with the later
St. Louis, B. & M. Ry. v. Brownsville Navigation Dist., 304 U.S. 295 (1938).
18. 240 U.S. 43 (1916). See also Director General v. Viscose Co., 254 U.S. 498
(1921) (striking silk from a list of commodities to be accepted for shipping is a
change in classification; its validity is for ICC). The four dissenters no doubt
reasoned that outright refusal to carry a commodity whether by cancellation of the
classification or otherwise was a breach of "common law duty." Armour & Co.
v. Alton R.R., 312 U.S. 195 (1941) (attack on railroad's practice of unloading
cattle into the pens of Union Stockyard which then imposed a fee on consignee);
St. Louis, B. & M. Ry. v. Brownsville Navigation Dist., 304 U.S. 295 (1938) (re-
fusal io furnish cars which would tend to "short-haul" the railroad company);
Thompson v. Texas M. Ry., 328 U.S. 134 (1946) (proper rental to be charged for
use of tracks by bankrupt railroad excusively for ICC).
19. Loomis v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 204 U.S. 43, 50 (1916).
1954]
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than prescribe the mere procedural time table of the lawsuit. It is a
doctrine allocating the law-making power over certain aspects of the
carrier-shipper relation. It transfers from court to agency the power
to determine the incidents of this relation at least where there is in-
volved day-to-day cost of service factors.
Though there has been and is no doubt that an action at law lies
for the violation or refusal to apply a carrier rate, rule, regulation or
custom, the courts have had difficulty where there is a question of
interpretation. There are two leading cases. The first in time is
Texas & Pacific Ry. v. American Tie Co.2° The shipper attempted
to ship oak railroad ties under a tariff for "lumber." The carrier
rejected them: the ties were not, the carrier argued, "lumber ;" it would
be necessary before accepting them to publish an applicable rate. In a
damage action, experts testified pro and con as to whether oak ties
were "lumber." Mr. Chief Justice White, author of Abilene, held
that the ICC alone could resolve this question. It is clear, he said, that
whether the lumber tariff included crossties was one primarily
to be determined by the Commission in the exercise of its power con-
cerning tariffs.. . . 2 " This probably carries the primary jurisdic-
tion doctrine a step beyond Abilene. It asserts, though not explicitly,
the power not only to make the tariff but to construe it. The meaning
of White's statement came into acute question in Great Northern Ry.
v. Merchants Elevator Co.' A shipper billed wheat from a point in
Iowa to a point in Minnesota where it was inspected and then recon-
signed to an ultimate destination. Under a railroad rule there was a
$5 per car charge for reconsignment but the charge was not applicable
to grain "held . . . for inspection and disposition orders incident
thereto at billed destination. . . ." " Was an order for reconsign-
ment after inspection a "disposition order incident to inspection?"
A Minnesota state court held that the court was competent to decide
this question.24 But was not the decision of this question an incident
of the Commission's "power concerning tariffs ?" In an earlier case,
Mr. Justice Brandeis had said that Abilene was applicable "to any
practice of the carrier which gives rise to the application of a rate." 25
The Court nevertheless, Mr. Justice Brandeis writing the opinion, held
that Abilene did not apply because the construction of a writing when
20. 234 U.S. 138 (1914).
21. Id. at 146.
22. 259 U.S. 285 (1922).
23. Id. at 289.
24. Merchants Elevator Co. v. Great Northern Ry., 147 Minn. 251, 180 N.W.
105 (1920).
25. Northern Pac. Ry. v. Solun, 247 U.S. 477, 483 (1918).
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"the words of a written instrument are used in their ordinary mean-
ing" presents a question solely of law. The Tie case was distinguished
on the ground that the testimony in that case showed a dispute as to
whether the words were used in a special or an ordinary sense. Since
juries might differ, uniformity would be destroyed. In the case at
hand, the question being "solely of law," uniformity could be secured
by the action of the Supreme Court. One might question whether the
reason thus given for the decision in the Tie case is well-founded.
The Justice relied on the procedural analogy concerning writings; dis-
puted questions of fact relating to construction are put to a jury. But
it is doubtful that this procedure is necessary or even appropriate when
the writing has the force of a statute. Questions concerning the con-
struction of a statute-though requiring the resolution of questions of
fact-should be decided uniformly and so should be settled authori-
tatively.
But Mr. Justice Brandeis does not rest Abilene solely on uni-
formity. He sounds the note of special administrative competence
which is later to become so dominant. Where, he explains, the ques-
tion is of "reasonableness" as in Abilene, the function is "administra-
tive."
the enquiry is essentially one of fact and of discre-
tion in technical matters; and uniformity can be secured only if its
determination is left to the Commission. Moreover, that deter-
mination is reached ordinarily upon voluminous and conflicting
evidence, for the adequate appreciation of which acquaintance with
many intricate facts of transportation is indispensable; and such
acquaintance is commonly to be found in a body of experts." 27
He then concludes: "Here no fact, evidential or ultimate, is in con-
troversy; and there is no occasion for the exercise of administrative
discretion." 28
It is not quite clear whether under this analysis a case like Tie
is completely assimilated to Abilene. White appeared to believe that
the ICC had the power to interpret as well as to make the regulation,
and that either exercise of power must be sustained if reasonable.
Brandeis holds that interpretation is for the court with prior recourse
26. See, de Sloov~re, The Functimos of Judge and Jury it the Interpretation
of Statutes, 46 HARV. L. Rxv. 1086 (1933) ; Attorney-General v. Cast-Plate Glass
Co., 1 Anstr. 39, 145 Eng. Reprint 793 (1792). Compare Commonwealth v. Wright,
137 Mass. 250 (1884), with Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 146 Mass. 142, 15 N.E.
491 (1888).
27. Great Northern Ry. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 291 (1922).
28. Id. at 294.
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only to resolve questions of fact. The court is not bound by the Com-
mission's interpretation, 9 however much weight it may be given; but
the court will accept the Commission's findings on questions of fact.30
It must be confessed that Justice Brandeis' distinction is not free
from difficulty. It may take a lawsuit to find out whether a tariff is
used in a peculiar sense requiring evidence, with the consequence that
the lawsuit has been all in vain. And quite apart from what the par-
ties are prepared to make issuable it is possible that the agency if it
had been given the opportunity to address itself to the question would
have been able to show that what appeared to be "solely a question of
construction" stood in need of peculiar knowledge for its solution.
Then, too, there will be those who find the distinction between law and
discretion a trifle old-fashioned. The resolution of an ambiguity in a
railroad tariff will depend on its purpose. This will ordinarily be
deduced from a history with which the agency has had a special con-
nection. Choice between competing meanings, if it is assumed that
either meaning is within the Commission's power to adopt, may be
thought to be a policy choice to be made by the Commission. Some
regulations are almost as indeterminate as the statute out of which
they grow,8 so that the process of "interpretation" may be more aptly
described as the process of further definition and rule making. This
is perhaps true of the CAB's regulation concerning the permitted con-
duct of the so-called irregular or non-scheduled air carriers. A court
has refused 82 to entertain a suit by a certificated carrier to enjoin illegal
operation by an irregular carrier. The court held that the agency alone
was competent to determine violation. The Board, as amicus, sup-
ported the plaintiff. The court said critically: "In other cases, also,
the Board has attempted to have the courts settle questions which
were primarily within the aura of responsibility committed to it." 83
The regulation, said the court, was not "static." The economic situa-
tion was "mutable." So, therefore, was the regulation. The power
thus recognized by the court to rewrite a regulation by reinterpretation
29. Brown Lumber Co. v. Louisville & N.R.R., 299 U.S. 393 (1937) ; cf. Adiron-
dack Transit Lines, Inc. v. United States, 59 F. Supp. 503 (S.D.N.Y. 1944), aff'd,
324 U.S. 824 (1945) (discussed in note 36 infra).
30. Cf. Crancer v. Lowden, 315 U.S. 631 (1942).
31. See the dissents of Jackson, J., in Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United
States, 342 U.S. 337, 343 (1952) and FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470,- 480
(1952).,
32. Trans-Pacific Airlines, Ltd. v. Hawaiian Airlines, Ltd., 174 F.2d 63 (9th
Cir. 1949); accord, American Airlines, Inc. v. Standard Airlines, Inc., 80 F. Supp.
135 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
33. Trans-Pacific Airlines, Ltd. v. Hawaiian Airlines, Ltd., 174 F.2d 63, 65
(9th Cir. 1949).
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is unorthodox and potentially dangerous." It reflects perhaps the
peculiarly vulnerable and obscure position of the non-certificated air
carrier. The court distinguished Great Northern: The regulation
there was "clear," no special familiarity with complicated factual situa-
tions was needed. When somewhat later the CAB itself brought an
enforcement action against an irregular carrier another court held that
the question of interpretation was within its competence "regardless of
its complexity." 15 In the meantime, however, the CAB had somewhat
clarified the regulation. It would appear then that the courts oscillate
between Tie and Great Northern depending perhaps on the character of
the regulation.
8 6
But despite the difficulties in applying Great Northern it is, in
my opinion, correct. Congress has granted and confirmed the original
jurisdiction of the courts to enforce carrier rules and tariffs. This
makes available to shippers hundreds of convenient local federal and
state judicial forums. The Commission is overwhelmed with a multi-
tude of vast tasks. It has been almost tearfully complaining that it is
starved for funds and cannot recruit adequate personnel.8 7 The function
34. See the curious three way split involving this regulation in CAB v. American
Air Transport Inc., 201 F.2d 189 (D.C. Cir. 1952). The judges there took a more
orthodox view of the CAB's power.
35. CAB v. Modern Air Transport, Inc., 179 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1950).
36. There appears to be a firmly established doctrine that if the scope of a motor
carrier certificate is "ambiguous," ICC interpretations are binding unless "clearly
erroneous or arbitrary." Whether this rule requires prior recourse is not clear.
Adirondack Transit Lines, Inc. v. United States, 59 F. Supp. 503 (S.D.N.Y. 1944),
aff'd, 324 U.S 824 (1945); Wilson v. United States, 114 F. Supp. 814 (W.D. Mo.
1953).
On the other hand, judges do not hesitate to construe regulations requiring
considerable penetration of technical mysteries. Brown Lumber Co. v. Louisville
& N.R.R., 299 U.S. 393 (1937) (Brandeis, J.); Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Gulf,
C & S.C. Ry., 270 U.S. 266 (1926) (Brandeis, J.); Burris Mill & Elevator Co. v.
Chicago R.I. & P.R.R., 131 F.2d 532 (10th Cir. 1942).
In American Ry. Express Co. v. Price Bros., Inc., 54 F2d 67 (5th Cir. 1931)
involving the question of whether small onions for replanting were "Onions, Green"
or "Plants, Strawberry and Vegetable" the court resolved the issue though it was
one which perhaps under Tie should have gone to ICC; in Louisville & N.R.R. v.
United States, 106 F. Supp. 999 (W.D. Ky. 1952) the court decided without prior
recourse that equipment containing 35% to 70% silver was a "silver article" and so
within a railroad regulation to the effect that it did not carry "silver articles" in
regular course; in Great Northern Ry. v. Ry-Krisp Co., 4 F. Supp. 358 (D. Minn.
1933) the court refused to determine whether "Ry-Krisp" was "bread" or "cereal";
in Norge Corp. v. Long Island R.R., 77 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1935) the court refused
to classify refrigerators as either "refrigerators and cooling apparatus combined"
or "cooling or freezing machines."
The state law has not been generally investigated but state courts occasionally
make very broad statements as to the requirement of prior recourse, particularly
in railroad cases. Chicago, I. & L. Ry. v. Railroad Comm'n, 175 Ind. 630, 637, 95
N.E. 364, 367 (1911); Marion Trucking Co. v. McDavid Freight Lines, Inc., 231
Ind. 519, 522, 108 N.E.2d 884, 885 (1952).
37. See 65 ICC AN. REP. 130 (1951).
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of interpreting the scope of specific tariffs is not central to carrier regu-
lation. The result in Great Northern is consistent with these facts. It
avoids the expense and frustration of two proceedings. It makes more
valuable the judicial jurisdiction without impairing the coherence of the
administrative program. It does not insist on the value of expertness
to the exclusion of other considerations. It recognizes that expert-
ness is a question of degree. More positively, it expresses a confidence
that the court will be able to do an adequate job. It will have the help
of counsel who will put before it much of what would be put before
the Commission. As Judge Clark has said in CAB v. Modern Air
Transport, Inc.: ". . . the outstanding feature of the doctrine is
properly said to be its flexibility permitting the courts to make a work-
able allocation of business between themselves and the agencies." "8
A special problem arises where the administrative agency is not
given jurisdiction to award reparations.3 9 This is the case with the
Federal Power Commission (FPC), the ICC with respect to motor
carriers, and the CAB. In such cases there is probably a judicial
remedy for violation of a rate as published or as revised following
administrative determination of unreasonableness. At least that is so
where the statute, as does the Motor Carrier Act, saves remedies not
inconsistent with the statute.40 But does an action at law lie for over-
charges made prior to the administrative determination of unreason-
ableness? In Montana-Dakota Co. v. Northwestern Public Service
Co.,4 ' the court held that no such action lay. This was based in part
on a history indicating that Congress did not believe such relief neces-
sary,42 but also on a rather reversed application of the primary juris-
diction doctrine. Justice Jackson argued that the agency alone could
determine what was a reasonable rate, and further stated: ". . . we
know of no case where the court has ordered reference of an issue which
the administrative body would not itself have jurisdiction to determine
in a proceeding for that purpose." 4 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dis-
38. 179 F.2d 622, 625 (2d Cir. 1950). The court cites McAllister, Statutory
Roads to Review of Federal Administrative Orders, 28 CALIF. L. REv. 129, 143, 147
(1939); and Note, Primary Jurisdiction, 30 GEo. L.J. 545 (1942).
39. McAllister, supra note 38, at 148, has a catalogue of causes of action under
regulatory statutes.
40. 49 STAT. 560 (1935), 49 U.S.C. §316(j) (1946) saves "any remedy or right
of action not inconsistent herewith."
41. 341 U.S. 246 (1951).
42. The consumer under FPC is a wholesaler and it was thought that he would
be adequately protected by invoking the power of the FPC to revise rates for the
future.
43. Montana-Dakota Co. v. Northwestern Service Co., 341 U.S. 246, 254 (1951).
In Hope Nat. Gas. Co. v. FPC, 134 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1943) the FPC declared
rates unreasonable to provide a premise for an action in a state court. The court
held that the filed rate was the only "legal" rate and governed all past transactions.
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senting," pointed to at least two cases"4 where an agency without
immediate jurisdiction had advised a court. It is true that the ques-
tions in those cases could have become issuable before the agency in
other contexts, but that was roughly true in this case since in pro-
nouncing a rate unreasonable for the future, the FPC may and usually
does find past unreasonableness.
The ICC has believed that despite the lack of a reparations power,
an action lies for past unreasonableness. This may be thought to
follow from the express saving of common law remedies. It is, to be
sure, doubtful that reparations in such a case serve a useful function.
Rates are under continuous scrutiny. Administrative condemnation
implies new circumstances or new understanding rather than serious
past injustice. And, as Mr. Justice Jackson observes in the Montana-
Dakota case, the overcharge has usually been passed along by the one
who paid it to some undiscoverable and unreimbursable consumer. But
if the action lies it is clear that primary jurisdiction applies 4' and the
ICC has in the motor carrier cases been making determinations to
serve as premises for judicial relief.4
But recently some courts have carried the application of the doc-
trine to extremes or at least have expressed extreme views. In one case
a plaintiff alleged that an airline had "unreasonably" cancelled a flight.
The court assumed that the airline's conduct had been done pursuant to
a "practice," and held that the CAB alone was competent to 'deter-
44. The dissenters did not dissent to the general substantive proposition stated
in the text. The complaint alleged a cause of action by a subsidiary against a
parent corporation for fraud. It alleged that the parent had filed with the FPC
excessive rates for sales by the parent to the subsidiary and prevented the subsidiary
from objecting to them. The dissenters believed that since the subsidiary was thus
prevented from securing even future administrative relief there was involved a
serious interference with its protected position under the statute. Mr. Justice Frank-
furter pointed to a number of cases in which the courts had improvised remedies
for violation of statutory protection, the most famous of which were Texas &
N.O.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930), and Steele v. Louisville
& N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). Justice Frankfurter expressed the dissenters' ap-
proach to the problem as follows: ". . . we cannot agree that the inability of the
Federal Power Commission to grant relief requires that courts be similarly dis-
abled. Courts, unlike administrative agencies, are organs with historic antecedents
which bring with them well-defined powers. They do not require explicit statutory
authorization for familiar remedies to enforce statutory obligations." Montana-
Dakota Co. v. Northwestern Service Co., 341 U.S. 246, 261 (1951).
45. General American Tank Car Corp. v. El Dorado Terminal Co., 308 U.S.
422 (1940); United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941). See also cases cited
note 8 supra.
46. But in Pennsylvania R.R. v. Fox & London, Inc., 93 F.2d 669 (2d Cir.
1938) where a carrier was suing for an undercharge, the court said in passing that
since the ICC cannot award reparations against a shipper, primary jurisdiction was
inapplicable.
47. Bell Potato Chip Co. v. Aberdeen Truck Lines, 43 M.C.C. 337 (1944).
The majority held that it would not entertain a proceeding unless a timely action
had been filed in court.
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mine the reasonableness of the practice." This is contrary to the earlier
railway cases holding that the courts are competent without prior
recourse to try cases alleging violation of so-called "common law"
duties. It is true, to be sure, that when a court can see that the alleged
common law duty would compel services involving rate elements it
will require prior recourse despite the fact that the practice has not
been covered by a published tariff. And as the years have worn on,
the area of putative regulations has more and more cut down "com-
mon law duty." 4' But problems still arise which the courts regard
as apt for independent judicial solution. Recently they have enter-
tained suits based on the refusal of a railroad to cross a picket line
to pick up or discharge freight,0 even though the ICC itself has enter-
tained jurisdiction in this area, sometimes ordering the railroad to
serve, at other times not. 1 It has been held that a Negro forced to
move into a "Jim Crow" car can sue the offending railroad.5 2 In such
cases the judiciary may appropriately conclude that because the prob-
lem involves factors not peculiarly or exclusively technical, it has an
historic warrant to solve it within the broad domain of its common
law jurisdiction. The jurisdiction and experience of the judge em-
braces all of the social conflicts regulated by law. His canon of legal
objectives may be correspondingly broader or at least less likely than
the administrator's to be distorted by specialized interest and re-
sponsibility.'
Cases of negligence may raise incidental questions concerning
"practices." Recently the airlines put into effect a rule barring a neg-
ligence suit unless the plaintiff had given notice of claim thirty days
after the accident. The rule was embodied in a filed tariff. Some
48. Adler v. Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 366 (E.D. Mo. 1941).
This case then proceeded before the CAB which dismissed his claim. Adler v.
Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc., 4 C.A.B. 113 (1943). Mack v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.,
'87 F. Supp. 113 (D. Mass. 1949) is sometimes cited as in accord but Judge
Wyzanski's decision in that case proceeds on the basis that the conduct complained
of was in accord with published rules. Schwartzman v. United Air Lines, 6 F.R.D.
517 (D. Neb. 1947), refused, on motion to dismiss, to treat the conduct complained of
as a "practice" immune from judicial scrutiny. The Adler case is criticized in Note,
Primary Jurisdiction, 30 GEo. L.J. 545 (1942).
49. See cases cited note 18 supra.
50. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Northern Pacific Terminal Co., 32 LAB. REL.
REP. (Labor-Management) 2386 (D. Ore. 1953); Pacific Gamble Robinson Co. v.
Minneapolis & St. L. Ry., 105 F. Supp. 794 (D. Minn. 1952).
51. See Note, Duty of Common Carrier to Cross Picket Line of Shipper's Em-
ployees to Receive Goods for Carriage, 67 HARv. L." RFv. 317 (1953).
* 52. Moore v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 98 F. Supp. 375 (E.D. Pa. 195i);
Solomon v. Pennsylvania R.R., 96 F. Supp. 709 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
53. This view is expressed in Markham and Blair, The Effect of Tariff Pro-
visions Filed uvider the Civil Aeronautics Act, 15 J. AmR L. 251 (1948). But see King,
The'Effects on Tariff Provisions; some Further Observations, 16 J. AiR L. f74
(1949).
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courts held the tariff to be reasonable. 4 Others declared it unrea-
sonable,5 acting on a doctrine announced years ago by the Supreme
Court."6 Under certain circumstances a rule disclaiming liability may
n6t be a "tariff" and the courts are competent to declare it unreason-
able. Cautious courts, however, under the current empire of the pri-
mary jurisdiction rule, are reluctant to assert patent inability without
first hearing from the agency.17 In the matter of the thirty day notice,
one court abated the negligence suit until the CAB acted. The carriers
objected that having no reparation power the CAB was without juris-
diction. But the Board pointed out that if this argument were applied
the carriers could slip into the tariffs all manner of outrageous im-
munity for past misconduct since the Board's staff was too small to
police the filings.58 It then denounced the thirty day rule as un-
reasonable and void. But more recently the CAB has adopted a regu-
lation that carrier rules limiting liability for personal injury are not
"required" to be filed as "tariffs." The advantages, says the CAB,
of uniform application of state law in negligence actions outweigh
uniform federal rules.ssa
In conclusion: the doctrine of primary jurisdiction should not be
applied automatically whenever in the course of a lawsuit a question
arises which could or might be the occasion for administrative judg-
ment. Its application should depend on a balance of considerations.
These questions should be asked: how peculiarly apt for administra-
tive discretion is the question to be decided? How seriously will a
decision in this very litigation (or a course or practice of such liti-
gation) jeopardize the statutory purpose? (In Abilene it would give
rise to outlawed discrimination.) How seriously would the require-
ment of prior recourse jeopardize the purposes of the judicial juris-
diction, as by imposing great inconvenience on at least one of the
parties in terms of expense or delay; or more seriously, by giving
54. Wilhelmy v. Northwest Air Lines, 86 F. Supp. 565 (W.D. Wash. 1949);
Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 58 F. Supp.
338 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
55. Shortly v. Northwestern Airlines, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 152 (D.D.C. 1952);
Thomas v. American Airlines, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 650 (E.D. Ark. 1952). These
cases rest on the authority of Pacific S.S. Co. v. Cackette, 8 F.2d 259 (9th Cir.
1925), cert. denied, 269 U.S. 586 (1926).
56. Boston & Maine R.R. v. Piper, 246 U.S. 439 (1918).
57. Lichten v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 189 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1951). This in-
volved a tariff unconditionally disclaiming liability for certain losses. The majority
applied primary jurisdiction. Frank, J., dissenting, thought the rule void under
Boston & Maine R.R. v. Piper, 246 U.S. 439 (1918). Frank also notes the CAB's
lack of reparations power and that no great expertise was involved. "If 'exhaustion
of remedies' is demanded in a case like this, the result will be the exhaustion of
litigants." Lichten v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 189 F.2d 939, 948 (2d Cir. 1951).
58. Continental Charters, Inc., 3 PixE & FISCHER AD. LAwv (2d ser.) 130 (CAB
1953).
58a. 19 FED. RaaE. 509 (1954).
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undue weight to the purposes represented by the agency as opposed to
the purposes entrusted to the judiciary? As we have seen in the
Juneau case, the court concluded without apparent effort that whether
a boycott was an unfair labor practice was not an exclusively admin-
istrative question to be resolved by prior resort to the Labor Board.
This question was of a kind with which the judiciary had dealt in the
past. There was the possibility of contrary judicial and administrative
decisions, at least initially, but the question involved was sufficiently
statable as one of law that there might be a tolerable reconciliation
through the medium of judicial review of contrary administrative
decisions. And, in so far as the decision would depend on resolution
of factual issues, a merely occasional contrariety of findings would not
threaten the statutory scheme. Regulation in this area is less sys-
tematic than in some. There is, therefore, more room for varying
judgment in particular situations, though even. here, a serious split
between court and agency could destroy the spirit of the legislation.
THE DOCTRINE AND THE ANTI-TRUST LAWS
In recent years the most controversial problems in this area have
arisen in the attempt to enforce the anti-trust laws against the so-called
regulated industries: the railroads, airlines, and water carriers. In an
early case " which a recent district court decision completely ig-
nores ' the United States brought an indictment under the Sherman
Act alleging that the defendant railroads and steamships had conspired
to exclude other steamship companies from the Alaska carrying trade.
It was alleged that the railroads refused to establish reasonable or
non-discriminatory joint through rates with the victimized steamship
companies in violation of the Commerce Act; also that the defendants
induced docking companies to discriminate. The defendants moved to
dismiss under Abilene. The court did dismiss the claims that the
through rates were discriminatory; this question was a transportation
problem to be solved by the regulatory process. But the conspiracy fo
monopolize was held to state a cause of action under the Sherman Act
which could be tried without prior recourse.
In the important Keogh " case one implication of this distinction
was developed. A shipper of commodities sued for damages under
59. United States v. Pacific & Artic Co., 228 U.S. 87 (1913). Other cases
refusing remedies to enforce obligations against carriers contrary to tariffs or ar-
rangements filed or approved by the ICC are: Central Transfer Co. v. Terminal
R.R., 288 U.S. 469 (1933); Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 297
U.S. 500 (1936); Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. Southern California Gas Co., 102
F. Supp 685 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
60. See text at note 77 infra.
61. Keogh v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 260 U.S. 156 (1922).
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the Sherman Act, alleging an agreement by the carriers to fix rates
pursuant to the so-called conference method. The rates so fixed had
been filed with the Commission; the rate had been attacked before the
Commission (by Keogh, himself, among others) and upheld as rea-
sonable. The court held that the action did not lie because damages
could not be proved. The rate as such was legal. Even were it
demonstrable that the conspiracy had resulted in higher rates, dam-
ages based on assumed lower rates could not be awarded unless and
until the Commission found the lower rates to be legal. Any other
rule would offend the requirement of uniformity. It will be noted
that basically this decision transcends the primary jurisdiction rule
in so far as it holds that there is no judicial action at all. The remedy
for damages under the Sherman Act has been superseded pro tanto
by such remedy as exists under the Commerce Act. The court rests
its decision on the avoidance of a square legal contradiction. Mr.
Justice Brandeis, however, explicitly excepts the right of the Govern-
ment to bring a criminal or equitable action to enforce the anti-trust
laws. "The fact that these rates had been approved by the Commis-
sion, would not, it seems, bar proceedings by the Government." 82
The court was, of course, not faced with the question whether in a
suit by the Government, prior recourse to the ICC would be required.
But the key case is United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard S.S.
Co.0 It goes much beyond Keogh in laying a basis for expansive
views of primary jurisdiction. A steamship company sued in equity
under the anti-trust laws to enjoin a conference of steamship companies
from driving it out of business. It alleged an agreement among the
defendants to grant lower or "contract" rates (by "as much as 100%o")
to shippers who used the conference carriers exclusively. It further al-
leged, inter alia, rebates, false rumors concerning the plaintiff and black-
listing of brokers who acted for plaintiff. The court dismissed this action
on the ground that under the Shipping Act the Shipping Board had
jurisdiction to outlaw all of these practices. Like Keogh it is a decision
that the remedies under the Sherman Act have been superseded by the
administrative remedies: in this case not reparations but cease and
desist orders. Thus the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in its strict
sense is not involved. But.Abilene, as well as Keogh, is relied on.
The decision, however, goes beyond both. Whereas these rested
on a contradiction between judicial relief and the statutory requirement
of uniformity among shippers, the decision here is placed avowedly
on the superior competence of the administrative body, on its knowledge
62. Id. at 162.
63. 284 U.S. 474 (1932).
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and experience in a field ". . . generally unfamiliar to a judicial
tribunal, but well understood by an administrative body especially
trained and experienced in the intricate and technical facts and usages
of the shipping trade. . . ."" The court did appeal to the value of
uniformity, but I take it that what is meant is not uniformity among
shippers as in Abilene but uniformity of policy. This is indeed a much
broader deference to expertness than anything thus far, and a much
bolder application of the implied repeal pro tanto of the Sherman Act.
In the famous case of Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. R.,65 this move-
ment suffered a check, though it would seem only a momentary one.'
Georgia, for herself and as parens patriae, asked leave to file an original
bill in the Supreme Court charging the railroads with a conspiracy
under the Sherman Act to impede the development of the South by
maintaining rates higher than in the North in order to protect the
North from Southern competition. As in Keogh, particular rates and
the rate level in general had been attacked before the Commission and
approved. Georgia, however, asked only for an injunction. A closely
divided Court allowed the bill to be filed. Relying heavily on the
dictum of Brandeis, J., in Keogh the majority argued that the con-
spiracy as such was a violation of the anti-trust laws, that the Com-
mission had no authority either to examine the legality of the con-
spiracy or to give relief against it, and that an injunction would not
interfere with the regulatory scheme. There is under the Transporta-
tion Act a broad area or band of reasonable rates designed to preserve
private initiative in rate making. Within this area the Sherman Act
requires that each carrier retain its freedom of action. ". . . repeals
by implication are not favored. Only a clear repugnancy between the
old law and the new results in the former giving way and then only
pro tanto the extent of the repugnancy." as
The dissenters relied first on Keogh. Georgia could not prove
damage. Proof of damage, they insisted, is as necessary to an injunc-
tion as to a damage action. Second, the Commission could entertain
rate proceedings based on discrimination and unreasonableness. Such
a proceeding so closely approximates the ground of complaint here
that, as in Cunard, the anti-trust remedies must be regarded as super-
seded. In any case an injunction would be meaningless and futile
unless it supervised the rates. Finally, by reason of the fact that the
Department of Justice had joined as amicus in favor of Georgia, there
is no need for the suit since there would appear to be no obstacle to a
64. Id. at 485.
65. 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
66. Id. at 456.
PRIMARY JURISDICTION RECONSIDERED
suit by "the Government" which is charged with the enforcement of
the anti-trust laws.
But in Far East Conference the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
was once more expanded, this time, and for the first time by the Supreme
Court, against a claim of "the Government." '7 The allegations were
almost identical to those in Cunard. It was charged that a shipping con-
ference had agreed on a "contract rate" system. Though the general
conference agreement had been filed with the administrative authority,
the contract rate tariffs had not been. This was in violation of a specific
requirement for filing, a violation of which entailed a criminal penalty.
There was a statutory declaration that an unfiled agreement was per se
a violation of the anti-trust laws. The Court held thaf "the Govern-
ment" could not sue under the Sherman Act, at least-not without first
seeking relief from the Maritime Board. The decision, however, was
not, as in Keogh, that the plaintiff, here the United States, had no
action. If the Maritime Board were to refuse to immunize the confer-
ence agreement presumably the United States could then sue for an
injunction or prosecute a criminal proceeding under the anti-trust laws.
Similarly in suits under the anti-trust laws for damages against the
regulated air carriers the action has been held to lie (subject to the
condition of prior recourse) "" because the CAB does not have repara-
tion power: it would be a strong thing to hold that the administrative
remedy of future prohibition has superseded the anti-trust remedy of
damages.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter writing for the Court in Far East Confer-
ence did not refer to the dictum in Keogh nor to the dissent in Georgia,
(in which he concurred), both of which would reserve anti-trust actions
by the Government. Relying on Cunard he said:
"The ame considerations of administrative expertise apply,
whoever initiates the action. - The same anti-trust laws and the
same Shipping Act apply to the same dual rate system. To the
same extent they define the appropriate orbits of action as between
court and Maritime Board." 6
67. However in United States v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 89 F. Supp.
981 (D. Del. 1950) a civil action to declare invalid the railway agreement establish-
ing the Railway Express Agency as their exclusive express instrumentality, the court,
though it refused to. dismiss, .referred the legality question to the ICC. The ICC
approved the agreement. The court refused to review the approval because ". . . the
orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission may not be attacked in a collateral
proceeding." United States v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 101 F. Supp. 1008,
1012 (D. Del. 1951).
68. S.S.W., Inc. v. Air Transport Ass'n, 191 F.2d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1951). Apgar
Travel Agency, Inc. v. International Air Transport Ass'n, 107 F. Supp. 706
(S.D.N.Y. 1952). But in Slick Airways, Inc. v. American Air Lines, Inc., 107 F.
Supp. 199 (D.N.J. 1951), JUdge Forman, in a very elaborate and well-reasoned
opinion, held that *prior recourse was unnecessary. He distinguished both S.S.W.
and Far East Conference.
69. Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 576 (1952).
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The Government protested that it should not be forced to go be-
fore the Board. It should not be deemed such a "person" as may under
the Act file a complaint. The Court thought this argument "friv-
olous :" certainly the Government could seek relief as a shipper. The
"large question" should not turn on a "debater's point." But with
deference it may be urged that the point has a bearing on the "large
question." The decision has been impliedly criticized for failure to
distinguish between the United States as private claimant and as
sovereign." Dissenting, Mr. Justice Douglas said: "Why should the
Department of Justice be remitted to the Board for its remedy?" "
Now from a theoretic point of view it would not seem that the
Department of Justice, as such, has rights or remedies, or that it can
be said to be any more representative of the "sovereignty" of the
United States than the Maritime Board. But that would be to con-
tinue the discussion in the dry terms of the "debater." And there is a
practical truth behind these criticisms. If so much is to be made of the
"expertise" of the Board, it must be remembered that expertise is not
the merely neutral accumulation of knowledge. or abstract understand-
ing. An agency regulating a single industry to some extent identifies
with the industry. The relation between agency and industry, is, in
the term of the biologist, symbiotic. This is not merely, as some would
imply, a sympathy with the industry's position though that is part of it.
But the agency over a period of time comes itself to have an investment
in the present status of the industry. By its regulatory activity it has
helped to determine the form of the industry. The agency may be,
therefore, not only sympathetic to the prevailing or dominant industry
forces, but hostile to potential disturbers of the status quo. There is
always a danger that such a combination of governmental and private
power will insist too exclusively or too narrowly on its point of view.
The position may become even more strongly consolidated if the agency
is an "independent" one not immediately subject to presidential con-
trol. The Department of Justice may become a focus for the forces
which would mitigate or qualify this concentration of power."2 Con-
gress has provided a remedy which it has not explicitly repealed. It
has indeed provided that an agreement filed with and approved by the
Board is immune from Sherman Act attack, but unless filed, is subject
to the anti-trust laws. The agreement here was neither filed nor ap-
70. Cf. HART AND WEcHsLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYsTEM
1131 (1953).
71. Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 578 (1952).
72. See Stem, "Inconsistency" in Government Litigation, 64 HARv. L REv.
759 (1951).
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proved. The Court, nevertheless, holds that the remedy is unavailable,
at least prior to a refusal of approval by the Board.
In earlier anti-trust suits, at least by the Government, the Court
had not been willing to hold that either the anti-trust remedy was gone
or that its exercise was subject to a condition of prior resort. This is
p4rticularly true of cases where the Federal Trade Commission exercises
concurrent jurisdiction under the anti-trust laws which it does over
industries not subject to an industry regulatory commission. To be
sure in these cases both the judicial and administrative remedies are
created by the same law. It could not, of course, be held that the anti-
trust remedy had been repealed, but it was logically possible to have
required prior resort, as in Abilene where both administrative and
judicial remedies were established in the same statute. But such a
position has never been seriously suggested except in a case where the
Trade Commission jurisdiction arose not under the Sherman Act but
the Webb-Pomerene Act."3 That Act immunized publicly filed agree-
ments of export associations but not all practices of such association.
The Act gave the Commission, as a matter of fact, only a power to
recommend prosecutions to the Department of Justice. The Court
refused to require prior resort. 4 The Commission "can give no rem-
edy; can make no controlling finding of law or fact." But the Court
said also that qualification of the Department of Justice's jurisdiction
by the primary jurisdiction doctrine would require "a clear expression
of that purpose by Congress." Abilene, in other words, was distin-
guished as resting on a palpable inconsistency between the untrammelled
judicial action and the statutory purpose.
Cunard, Georgia and Far East differ, however, from the situation
in which the Trade Commission has concurrent jurisdiction. The
jurisdiction of the FTC affects industries which are still legally gov-
erned by the competitive norm. The carrier industries are each subject
to a comprehensive regulation of rates and facilities. The scheme of
regulation supplants or may supplant competition. Competitive rates
may be administratively disapproved as too low. They may not be
changed without agency permission. In Far East the agency could
grant anti-trust exemption of the very agreement in question. It was
not argued, of course, by the dissenters in Georgia that the ICC could
approve an agreement by the carriers not to file competitive rates or an
agreement to maintain a higher rate level in the South. The dissenters'
position was rather that the regulatory scheme was so comprehensive,
73. 15 U.S.C. 61 (1946).
74. United States Alkali Export Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 325 U.S. 196
(1945), relying on United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188 (1939).
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that it so qualified the area in which competition could operate, that to
apply the competitive criteria of the anti-trust laws to the carrier ac-
tivities in question was arbitrary and futile. The regulatory purposes
would bring into play criteria which cut across anti-trust criteria.
There was thus created an implied contradiction between the regulatory
and the anti-trust criteria which would make applicable the reasoning
of the Abilene case.
Perhaps such inconsistency does exist in Far East. The Board
had an explicit power to exempt the agreement in question. This is
something more than concurrent jurisdiction (as in Trade Commission
cases). It is a power to absolve from the anti-trust laws for reasons
of policy deriving from another law. Thus, though a court might hold
that the agreement violated the anti-trust laws, and so enjoin it, the
Board then could render the judicial proceedings nugatory by approv-
ing it. Under the statute the agreement is subject to the anti-trust laws
unless filed and approved until which time it would seem clear that the
court does have jurisdiction. Nevertheless, a court of equity might
consider an injunction futile or wasteful of its process, if it can be there-
after undone by administrative action." But as my colleague, Pro-
fessor Hart, has suggested, the Court might at least have conditioned
its refusal of relief on a filing of the agreement by the defendant. And
it might also have retained the action in the event that the agency
refused approval."
It is with some misgiving that I reach the conclusion that Far
East was correctly decided. The maxim, that repeals by implication
are not favored, rests on the solid ground that large debatable issues of
policy should be resolved by Congress, the most broadly representative
organ. I am to some extent troubled that the sole organ for resolving
the issue of consumer and competitor protection involved in the anti-
trust laws becomes an agency so powerfully moved to support industry
price regulation. There is to be sure judicial review of the exercise of
this power and Mr. Justice Frankfurter suggests that to secure unity
and coherence the role of the judiciary should be channelled into this
75. This point was stressed by Judge A. N. Hand in his opirion for the Circuit
Court of Appeals in United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 50 F.2d 83
(2d Cir. 1931), aff'd, 284 U.S. 474 (1932), discussed in text at note, 63 supra.
76. In Far East the action was dismissed because if the Board's order were
favorable to the United States, the United States could reapply for equitable relief.
There is some uncertainty as to when the action will be dismissed and when
stayed. If prior resort is in aid of an action (as for breach of contract) the
action will be stayed rather than dismissed. General' American Tank Car Corp. v.
El Dorado Terminal Co., 308 U.S. 422 (1940). In recent anti-trust cases seeking
damages which the agency could not grant the action has been stayed. S.S.W.,
Inc. v. Air Transport Ass'n, 191 F.2d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1951). No doubt the action
will not be dismissed if there is a potential action for damages which may be barred
by limitation.
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single course. One might be afraid that the agency will defeat even
this check by failing to take action. Under Far East, however, the
Court has announced that the Department of Justice may file a claim
before the Board. Furthermore, the statute makes it clear that the
Department may initiate a prosecution for failure simply to file the
agreement which is made in itself a crime punishable by a penalty of
$1,000 per day.
Immediately following Far East a district court held that a crim-
inal action was within its doctrine." This case alleged a conspiracy
almost identical to that in the early Pacific & Arctic case discussed
above,7 not only in its legal character but actually again involving the
Alaska carrying trade. The court either did not know of the case or
regarded it as overruled by Far East. More or less paraphrasing the
opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the judge, in deciding that a crim-
inal case is no different from a civil case, says: "The Far Eastern [sic]
Conference case constitutes another milestone in the tendency we have
already noted-a tendency to rely more and more upon administrative
'expertise.' "J,
This decision would indeed appear to derive more from a
"tendency" of judicial decision than from a direct reading of the statute.
It cannot be said here, as it was in Far East, that judicial action would
be futile since the judgment would have been a penalty for past mis-
conduct. Furthermore the statute appears to make it clear that the
exemption is limited to the future.8" The crime, therefore, has been com-
mitted whatever the agency decides. What then is the function of prior
recourse? It could be said, perhaps, that the agency's judgment will
have relevance to whether the agreement is a violation of the anti-trust
laws, that the anti-trust laws themselves are to be read as modified by the
concept of regulation, by, as it were, a rule of reason. It thus becomes
a condition of criminal prosecution that the Government first prove its
case before the agency. If the Government then prevails it must if it
chooses to enforce a criminal penalty retry the litigation before a jury.
This is a high price to pay for "expertise." It is doubtful that it should
be imposed without more warrant than the ill-defined tendency indicated
in the existence of a related administrative jurisdiction. The criminal
77. United States v. Alaska S.S. Co., 110 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Wash. 1952).
78. United States v. Pacific & Arctic Co., 228 U.S. 87 (1913). See text at
note 59 supra.
79. United States v. Alaska S.S. Co., 110 F. Supp. 104, 111 (W.D. Wash.
1952).
80. In S.S.W., Inc. v. Air Transport Ass'n, 191 F.2d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1951), a suit
for treble damages, the court assumes that immunization would relate back. The
statute there, however, is not explicit, as it is here, concerning the effect of immuni-
zation.
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sanction has a role different from the injunction and consequently dis-
tinct from the administrative cease and desist order. In its purpose
and in its method it is peculiarly within the province of the judiciary
and it is not easy to attribute to Congress a purpose to subject it to a
requirement of prior recourse. If it is doubtful policy to apply criminal
sanction to the ill-defined proscriptions of the anti-trust law, it is then
good policy to apply them where they speak most clearly and in a way
that will preserve that clarity. Most of the agreements in question here
are, unless immunized, ipso facto violations of the anti-trust laws. If
the administrative judgment developed on prior recourse is to enter
into the determination of past violation, this clarity is lost.
Let us finally focus our problem in terms of certain recent cases in
which the pleader has alleged a conspiracy which upon the face of it the
agency either has no jurisdiction to consider or no ultimate power to
approve.
In a recent case, Seatrain Lines, Inc. v. Pennsylvania R.R.,s' a
common carrier by water of loaded railroad freight cars complained of
a twenty year conspiracy by the railroads to drive it from business by
refusing to supply it with cars. The matter has been long fought out
before the ICC. The ICC has held that it is without power to compel a
rail carrier to permit delivery of its cars to a water carrier unless a
through route has been agreed upon or ordered by the Commission.
At the same time the Commission purports (rather contradictorily) to
have power over carrier rules with respect to the use and interchange
of cars. The railroads had filed with the ICC rules agreeing to free
interchange of cars among rail carries but providing that cars shall not
be delivered to a water carrier without permission of the owner. Sea-
train alleged an agreement among carriers to deny Seatrain this per-
mission, and to discourage shippers from using Seatrain. Seatrain
asked the court, among other things, to undo this conspiracy by order-
ing the railroads to participate in shipments. This the court held
itself incompetent to do under Cunard (Keogh, too, would seem in
point), nor could the court pass on the validity of the agreement filed
with the ICC which in essence appeared to embody the alleged con-
spiracy or at least to embody its effects. But Judge Hastie in a
meticulously careful and scrupulous opinion held that a complaint
limited to the conspiracy to influence individual carrier action would
state a cause of action. He was mindful that this aspect of the con-
spiracy, and the relief available to Seatrain under it, was incidental to
the larger grief arising out of the agreement per se and the failure to
secure relief from the ICC. But he further stated:
81. 207 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1953).
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"A division of jurisdiction between court and commission in
the interest of orderly administration does not minimize the seri-
ousness of conspiracy in restraint of trade and should not deprive
a litigant of the privilege of seeking judicial relief for even' the
'less important' aspects of such conspiracy when the court can
consider and act upon them without invading the administrative
province." 82
It should be noted that Judge Hastie's technique and result are
perhaps inconsistent with the Court's handling of a similar problem in
Cunard. There, as here, the pleader alleged practices which prima
facie the agency either could not or would not approve. Justice Suther-
land answered that whether the agreement appeared to be lawful or
unlawful on its face the whole matter should first be explored by the
agency.8m It must be admitted that there is much good sense in this
view. The court may suspect that the pleader has drafted his allega-
tions with an eye to avoid primary jurisdiction and that the allegations
do no more than characterize somewhat tendentiously what the court
regards as basically an administrative issue. The court, therefore,
would at the least have discretion to evaluate the substantiality of the
controversy alleged to be beyond the reach of administrative judgment.
The Cunard approach was taken recently by one court 8 4 and rejected
by another 85 in connection with an alleged conspiracy by the certifi-
cated air carriers against non-certificated carriers or their agents.
On the other hand, the method of the majority in Georgia v. Penn-
sylvania R. R.,85 supports Judge Hastie. There is to be sure a possible
82. Id. at 262.
83. United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U.S. 474, 487 (1932).
84. S.S.W., Inc. v. Air Transport Ass'n, 191 F.2d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
85. In Slick Airways, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 107 F. Supp. 199
(D.N.J. 1951), Judge Forman denied a motion to dismiss, without prejudice to a
renewal of the motion, if after the proofs it appeared that there existed an ad-
ministrative problem. The defendant then sought a prohibition against the judge
on the ground that he was without jurisdiction. The petition was dismissed,
American Airlines, Inc. v. Forman, 204 F.2d 230 (3d Cir. 1953). Judge Hastie
held that there was no clear statutory requirement of prior resort. There was a
need ". . . for judicial appraisal of the less than apparent interrelation of legisla-
tion under which it is argued that primary resort should be to an administrative
tribunal and other provisions of law which standing alone would empower a court
to proceed forthwith." Id. at 232.
86. In Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Consolidated Gas Co., 184 F.2d
552 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 906 (1950), the court (more or less) follows
the same technique. The plaintiff, a producer of power and a subsidiary of defend-
ant, a distributor of power, alleged that defendant had imposed on plaintiff exclusive
and restrictive contracts concerning the production of power and that it had de-
pressed the price paid to plaintiff. The court held that the complaint stated a cause
of action under the Sherman Act even though the production arrangements and
rates had been approved by the Federal Power Commission. Later the court held
the contracts void despite the approval by the FPC of the rates; Consolidated Gas
Co. v. Pennsylvania Power Co., 194 F.2d 89 (4th Cir. 1952). But thereafter the
orders of the FPC requiring the parties to act more or less as they would under the
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difference in jurisdiction between the ICC, on the one hand, which has
power simply to enjoin violations of the Transportation Act and the
CAB and Maritime Board which have jurisdiction over unfair methods
of competition. But this narrow ground has not been, I would think,
the deciding factor. I do not feel assurance as to which of these views
is correct and I shall conclude by stating the truth I find in each position.
Judge Hastie does not agree with the minority in Georgia as to
the futility of his course. Surely the lane left open by his analysis is
cramped and discouraging, surrounded, parallelled and crossed as it is
by the broad avenues of administrative power. Yet it does not follow
that the court should declare the road closed. It should be put squarely
up to Congress to make such a decision. Congress may find it politically
unfeasible completely to exempt the railroads from the anti-trust law,
however much it might welcome virtual repeal by judicial action.
Nevertheless, that very difficulty reflects a significant opinion that there
is a value in this judicial jurisdiction. Whatever its "expertise" the
Commission is not well situated to censure the kind of abuse which is in
question. The peculiar and elaborate involvements between regulator
and regulated have already been mentioned. But even putting that
aside there is the sheer bulk of day-to-day administrative business.
There is the continuing refusal of Congress to vote the Commission,
despite its almost frantic expressions of distress, the funds needed to
maintain personnel adequate to its work. After Georgia the railroads
prevailed upon Congress to approve the conference method of rate
making condemned by the Court. But the conference agreements were
made subject to ICC approval. In successive reports the ICC has
noted that its staff is inadequate to police these activities. 87 If it be
said that judicial relief is nevertheless futile where only general injunc-
tions can be issued, it is at least arguable that judicial condemnation,
even though the remedy is inadequate and abstract, may exert a lever-
age, may add at least one more pressure to the whole complex pressures
that go to condition and shape the administrative process. 88
contract were upheld by the Supreme Court. Pennsylvania Power Co. v. FPC,
193 F.2d 230 (D.C. Cir.), aff'd, 343 U.S. 414 (1952). The majority argued that the
FPC had not required the parties to act under the invalidated contracts. The
dissenters thought otherwise. The lower court had argued that the regulatory
scheme impliedly repealed the Sherman Act pro tanto.
87. See 65 ICC ANN. REP. 57 (1951).
88. Professor Louis B. Schwartz believes that Seatrain does not go far enough
in rejecting primary jurisdiction. He would have the judiciary whether on original
or review jurisdiction impose competition ". . . to the maximum extent consistent
with the technical or other defined objectives of the applicable legislation."
Schwartz, Legal Restrictions of Competition in the Regulated Industries: An Abdi-
cation of Judicial Responsibility, 67 HAv. L. REv. 436, 475 (1954).
But quaere if such a result can be reached without a more explicit statutory
warrant than now exists. I am exploring this broader question in a forthcoming
article in Volume 67 of the Harvard Law Review.
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The argument to the contrary is this. The basic or polar standards
of the anti-trust laws and the regulatory statutes are opposed. It is
true that the opposition is somewhat softened in practice. The
anti-trust laws' insistence on competition may be in some measure
mitigated by the practical considerations derived from our economic
structure. And on the other hand the regulatory standard embraces
competition as one of its mechanisms. But neither, however tempered,
quite approaches the other. In so far as a given competitive or mon-
opolistic tactic is adjudged to be closely related to practices which are
admittedly subject to administrative control it is intellectually arbitrary
to tear the complex apart and apply different standards to the fragments.
If Congress has not explicitly repealed the anti-trust laws in toto,
it may be because there remains always the possibility of practices not
closely related to the regulated area. To these the anti-trust laws apply.
Furthermore, in the regulated area, judicial power may be needed when
prior resort has been completed, as where exemption is refused by the
administrative agency in part or in whole. It would be very
difficult to draft a statute drawing these distinctions. They must be
left to judicial development. If this gives too much leeway to agency
indulgence of restrictive practices, it is nevertheless doubtful that
judicial nibbling at the edges of the central core of administrative power
can make a contribution sufficiently great to run the risks of intellectual
confusion.89 The indicated remedy, then, if one is needed, is with
Congress.
CONCLUSION
The primary jurisdiction, in conclusion, is in danger of becoming
a stereotype, an automatic judicial response to an abstraction labelled
"expertise." The competence of an administrative agency is defined
by statute. I do not argue for a narrow, begrudging construction of
that definition. I do not suggest that nothing is granted except what
is set out in so many words. The construction should allow to the
agency the powers needful to a rational and integrated administration
of the statute in so far as such powers can be implied or are not more
particularly excluded. These implied powers will rest in some measure
on a concept of special competence. But original jurisdiction granted
to the courts under statute or common law presumptively serves
valuable purposes. These purposes should not be impeded by costly or
delaying deference to administrators' "expertise" beyond the decent
needs of the administrative process. We should not insist on expert-
89. Compare the solution suggested in Note, 64 HAMv. L. REV. 1154 (1951).
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ness as an absolute condition to the solving of all problems in which it
potentially is capable of playing a role. Expertness today, as embodied
in our administrative agencies, is in important respects the day-to-day
reflection of the forces which it seeks to govern. Its role as a solvent
is accordingly conditioned. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is a
valid one so far as necessary to avoid contradiction, confusion, and
wastefulness. Beyond that, its use should be sparing.
